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Abstract 
This paper analyses the annual report disclosures of the other six largest oil 
companies in reaction to the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. It focusses on changes 
in disclosures that can be ascribed to the oil spill. The companies all increased 
their environmental disclosures, with positive disclosures increasing most. It  
shows the use of an image enhancement disclosure strategy and a (partial) 
disclaiming of responsibility disclosure strategy, but do not find evidence 
consistent with a deflection of attention disclosure strategy, probably due to the 
high profile of the incident. It is found that BP’s strategy of repeating disclosures 
about remedial activities several times in different parts of the annual report 
ensures: an emphasis on the positive, that all stakeholders regardless of their area 
of focus are likely to notice this disclosure, an increase in the volume of 
environmental disclosure, and that less detail can be disclosed, reducing 
litigation-related risks.  
Key words  
Environmental accounting, environmental reporting, legitimacy theory, 
legitimisation strategies 
1. Introduction 
Environmental issues have become an increasingly important matter for 
companies to manage as various stakeholder groups continue to put 
pressure on companies to accept accountability for the environmental 
impact of their operations (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000). These 
stakeholder groups demand that companies minimise the negative 
environmental impacts of their operations. Under these conditions, 
legitimacy theory predicts, a company will use various disclosure 
strategies to preserve an image of a socially responsible corporate citizen 
Journal of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Environmental Accountability     
104 
 
to ensure continued access to the resources needed for businesses success 
(Lindblom 1993).  
Companies with bad environmental news have been shown to react by 
ignoring the negative and disclosing more positive environmental 
information (Deegan & Rankin 1996). Patten (1992) showed that 
companies facing an environmental crisis will increase the environmental 
disclosures within their annual report in an attempt to regain their 
legitimacy. By doing this, companies can use disclosures to manage 
society’s perceptions about their crisis, legitimise their operations, and 
ensure their continued success (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000). However, 
to maximise the potential of these companies to regain their legitimacy, 
O’Donovan (2002) shows that they will use different disclosure strategies. 
According to Cho (2009), companies facing an environmental crisis are 
most likely to undertake an image enhancement strategy where they 
attempt to restore their image through increased self-praising 
environmental disclosures. Companies may also disclaim responsibility 
and/or attempt to deflect attention away from the event (Cho 2009). 
In spite of the insights provided in the prior literature, disclosure decisions 
can be complex and are still not fully understood. For example, Wilmhurst 
and Frost (2000) highlight the need for research into the trade-off that 
occurs when companies facing a crisis have competing strategic 
requirements for information to include in their annual reports. Given the 
increasing public awareness of and concern about environmental issues, 
stakeholders increasingly challenge companies to respond with appropriate 
disclosure trade-offs (Manning 2004). An examination of the disclosures 
following a significant social or environmental crisis that affects a variety 
of stakeholders can therefore potentially provide further insights into these 
disclosure decisions and disclosure strategies.  
This paper examines the disclosure patterns and strategies used by oil 
companies in response to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. It focusses on the 
annual report, because despite recent research attention to websites (e.g. 
Barac 2004), stand-alone reports, and media release disclosures, managers 
still use the annual report in unique ways within their overall corporate 
communications strategies (De Villiers & Van Staden 2011). BP’s first 
annual report after this crisis, their 2010 report, was published on 5th 
March 2011. Therefore, this is one of the first papers to investigate the 
reactions of the oil companies to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. The crisis 
conditions are unique because of the scale of the crisis, the setting of the 
crisis as it affected a highly populated area in an OECD country, and 
because of the increased environmental awareness after the oil spill that 
had not accompanied many prior environmental crises. These extreme 
conditions make this an ideal case to examine for the purpose of extending 
existing theory. The Gulf of Mexico oil spill raised questions about the 
extraction methods used by the entire oil industry. Therefore, not only 
BP’s annual reports analysed, but also those of the five largest oil 
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companies other than BP, namely, Total, Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron and 
ConocoPhillips, before and after the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Among other 
analyses, the research followed Hackston and Milne (1996) in counting 
environmental disclosures sentences and classifying them into positive, 
negative and neutral categories. Analysis of all environmental disclosures 
was performed, but oil spill related disclosures were kept separate in the 
case of BP. Cho (2009) was also used in identifying whether the oil 
companies adopted image enhancement, disclaimer and/ or deflection 
disclosure strategies. These strategies are discussed in detail below, but a 
glance at Table 1 would answer any questions the reader may have at this 
stage. Finally, disclosures are appraised for any other prominent 
characteristics. 
The findings show that the overall environmental disclosures of the oil 
companies increased after the oil spill. Disclosures that reflect positively 
on the company increased more than negative or neutral disclosures. It is 
also find that an image enhancement disclosure strategy was mainly 
chosen by all of the major oil companies, not just BP, to regain legitimacy. 
Further, the paper makes a contribution to the understanding of disclosure 
strategies following a crisis by showing that BP repeated exactly the same 
remedial action information over and over, sometimes within the same 
section and also in different sections in their annual report, in each 
instance without further elaboration. Interpretation of this strategy is made 
as an attempt to ensure that all relevant publics, independent of their areas 
of interest, were likely to get the positive information regarding BP’s 
remediation without BP incurring the risk of providing additional 
information that may be useful to future litigants.  
These results and insights will be of potential interest to investors, 
accountants, managers of crisis hit companies, regulators, environmental 
groups, the research community, and individuals with a specific interest in 
the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Additional disclosure insights will potentially 
allow: investors in future to make better risk assessments based on 
disclosures, managers and accountants to better understand the 
legitimising strategies usually used in response to a crisis, regulators to 
identify if there is a need for regulatory intervention, environmental 
groups to improve their assessments of corporate environmental 
responsibility based on disclosures, and the research community to have a 
more comprehensive understanding of the legitimising disclosure 
strategies managers use following an environmental crises.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section 
discusses theoretical perspectives on legitimacy theory, the disclosure 
decisions of crisis affected companies, and expectations regarding the 
disclosure decisions of allthe major oil companies after the Gulf of Mexico 
oil spill. Next, background information about the Gulf of Mexico oil spill 
is provided, before discussion of the methods of data collection and 
analysis. This is followed by the results section, a discussion that provides 
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an explanation for the results in relation to prior literature and an analysis 
of the implications of these results. The paper then concludes with a 
summary, limitations, and suggestions for potential future research.  
2. Literature review and expectations 
2.1 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory is based on the concept of a social contract whereby 
companies are in need of a positive relationship with society in order to 
ensure access to resources (Shocker & Sethi 1974). Companies seek 
congruence between perceptions of outsider’s of the company’s social 
values and society’s conception of acceptable organisational conduct 
(Mathews 1993). A perceived disparity between a company’s values and 
societal values represents a threat to the company’s legitimacy and a 
breach of their social contract (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975). A legitimacy 
threat can be serious, even endangering continued survival, because 
stakeholders can withdraw support and limit resources (Parsons 1960; 
Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). This threat to resource access can take many 
forms, such as government increasing regulations and reporting 
requirements, decreased customer demand for the companies’ products, 
decreased interest in employment in the company by sought after 
candidates, or shareholders and lenders disinvesting from the company 
(Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000). Therefore, it is important for companies, 
not only to do the right thing, but also to manage the perceptions of their 
various relevant publics, otherwise known as their stakeholders (Oliver 
1991). 
2.2 Perception management through disclosure 
Perception management can be difficult as legitimacy is dynamic and a 
company can lose legitimacy due to shifts in the interests of their relevant 
publics or the composition of their relevant publics (O’Donovan 2002). 
Disclosure provides a relatively cost effective means of influencing 
opinion and reducing any legitimacy gap (Cormier & Gordon 2001). It can 
also be argued that remedial action without disclosure is not enough to 
repair legitimacy, because relevant publics need to be informed about 
actual changes before their perceptions can change. Therefore, corporate 
disclosure strategies are important legitimising/perception management 
tools. 
2.3 Disclosures after a legitimacy crisis 
Legitimacy crises can be precipitated by sudden revelations of new 
information about a company that differs from prior perceptions (Sethi 
1977). An environmental accident event linked to a company can lead to 
such a legitimacy crisis (Elsbach 1994). Many studies have investigated 
how a crisis can affect a company’s legitimacy, the effect of industry on 
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legitimacy (Doppegieter & De Villiers 1996; De Villiers & Lubbe 2001), 
trends over time (Antonites & De Villiers 2003), and the disclosure 
patterns of the companies in reaction to a legitimacy threat (Sutton & 
Callahan 1987; Patten 1992; Elsbach 1994; Deegan & Rankin 1996; 
Walden & Schwartz 1997; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000). Studies 
focussing on legitimacy following ExxonMobil’s 1989 Alaskan oil spill 
caused by the Exxon Valdez are particularly relevant here (e.g., Patten 
1992; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000). Patten (1992) shows that this oil 
spill was followed by increased self-laudatory environmental disclosures 
by all of the oil companies. Walden and Schwartz (1997) demonstrate that 
these increased environmental disclosures were made in response to 
increased public policy pressure. Oil companies responded immediately to 
the legitimacy threat (Walden & Schwartz 1997). Deegan, Rankin and 
Voght (2000) extended these studies by showing that the annual reports of 
oil companies two years subsequent to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, 
contained information about the preventative methods and emergency 
response procedures undertaken in response to the spill. Deegan, Rankin 
and Voght (2000) also investigated the reactions of oil companies to 
BHP’s Iron Baron oil spill. Oil companies responded to the Iron Baron 
incident by increasing incident related social disclosures two years 
subsequent to the spill in an attempt to regain legitimacy (Deegan, Rankin 
& Voght 2000). 
An increase in positive disclosures has been identified as the most 
prevalent way to manage relevant publics’ perceptions (Deegan 2002). 
Further examination of disclosure strategies following a legitimacy threat 
will potentially provide further insights (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; 
Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; Oliver 1991) and information about the 
company’s motivations for disclosing environmental information 
(O’Donovan 2002).  
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), Lindblom (1993) and O’Donovan (2002) 
each developed categories of disclosure strategies that companies trying to 
repair their legitimacy will adopt. Cho (2009) synthesises and reclassifies 
these prior classifications into three disclosure strategies. Suchman (1995) 
also identifies three disclosure strategies that companies dealing with a 
legitimacy threat could implement. Prior classifications are shown in 
Table 1 to facilitate comparison. Note that because Suchman’s (1995) 
strategies are all legitimacy repairing strategies, his classifications are 
somewhat different. Nevertheless, similarities emerge as explained below. 
According to Disclosure Strategy 1, the disclosure of self-laudatory 
environmental information can increase the appearance of legitimacy (Cho 
2009). Disclosures under this strategy are aimed at enhancing the image of 
the company by either, reiterating past achievements (Lindblom 1993), 
emphasising current positive environmental activities (Dowling & Pfeffer 
1975; O’Donovan 2002; Cho 2009), or framing the actions taken in 
regards to the activity that was a threat to their legitimacy in a positive 
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manner (Suchman 1995). Also by changing the focus towards positive 
activities, a company is able to symbolically fulfil its social contract, 
whilst not actually altering activities or methods (Buhr 1998; Neu, 
Warsame & Pedwell 1998). 
Table 1: Legitimising disclosure strategies  
 Disclosure 
Strategy 1 -Image 
Enhancement 
Disclosure 
Strategy 2 -
Disclaim 
Responsibility 
Disclosure 
Strategy 3 - 
Deflect Attention 
Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975, 
p.127) 
Adapt – change 
outputs, goals and 
methods of 
operation to 
conform to 
prevailing 
definitions of 
legitimacy  
Alter – change the 
definition of social 
legitimacy so that it 
conforms to the 
organisations 
present practices, 
output and values 
Identification – 
become identified 
with symbols, 
values or 
institutions which 
have a strong base 
of social 
legitimacy 
Lindblom (1993, 
pp.13-16) 
Educate – inform 
the relevant public 
about recent 
organisational 
actions that remedy 
previously 
perceived 
deficiencies  
Alter – change the 
perceptions of 
external parties 
Deflection – 
deflect attention 
from the perceived 
problem areas by 
changing the focus 
of external parties 
Suchman (1995, 
pp.598-599) 
Restructure – 
selectively confess 
that limited aspects 
of organisations 
operations were 
flawed (Second in 
process) 
Avoid panic – use a 
mixture of gain 
(intense activity) 
and maintain 
(sensitivity to 
environmental 
reactions) in order 
to repair legitimacy 
(Third in process) 
Normalise – 
separate 
threatening 
revelation from 
larger assessments 
of organisation as a 
whole (First in 
process) 
O’Donovan 
(2002, pp.359-
360) 
Conform – change 
to conform to what 
society expected 
Alter – shape the 
social perceptions 
of the corporation  
Avoidance – make 
no disclosures 
about the negative 
event  
Cho (2009, 
pp.37-38) 
Image 
Enhancement- 
appear legitimate 
by linking itself to 
positive social 
values by 
disclosing self-
praising 
information  
Disclaimer – appear 
legitimate by 
issuing disclaimer 
statements denying 
its responsibilities  
Deflection – 
appear legitimate 
by redirecting 
attention from 
specific social and 
environmental 
concern 
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An oil company trying to regain legitimacy might make symbolic 
disclosures that announce an immediate inquiry into the cause of the spill 
and assure the public that any measures necessary to prevent a similar 
future accident will be undertaken (O’Donovan 2002, p.348). Therefore, in 
using the first disclosure strategy, labelled "image enhancement", the 
company makes symbolic, selective, positive, self-laudatory disclosures 
aimed at repairing image and legitimacy (Deegan & Gordon 1996).  
The second disclosure strategy involves disclosures that change the 
expectations of the companies’ relevant publics, so that the company is not 
held responsible for the event which threatens their legitimacy (Lindblom 
1993; Cho 2009). In undertaking this strategy a company attempts to 
redefine its legitimacy so that no changes have to be made to their 
environmental activities (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975). It is only the 
perceptions of the external parties about the company that will be 
changing (Lindblom 1993; O’Donovan 2002). Suchman (1995) maintains 
that companies adopt this strategy in an attempt to alleviate the concerns 
of their relevant publics due to the high remediation costs attached to a 
crisis. In denying responsibility, the company gains time to plan and 
manage any remediation they may be forced into (Suchman 1995). 
Therefore, disclaiming responsibility can be a valuable strategy that is 
commonly used by companies for disclosures in their annual reports 
(Preston, Wright & Young 1996). Companies can claim that they are not 
responsible and that it is unfair to expect companies like themselves to be 
held responsible.  
In the final disclosure strategy, companies use their disclosures to deflect 
attention away from the crisis that has caused the threat to their legitimacy 
(Cho 2009). This is done by identifying with symbols or values seen as 
legitimate (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975), and/or by making no disclosures 
about the event (Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 1998; O’Donovan 2002). The 
company typically keeps information about the threatening event separate 
from information about general operations in order to normalise and lend 
legitimacy to the company (Suchman 1995). Companies thus repair their 
legitimacy by challenging the link between the crisis and the company 
(Stephens, Malone & Bailey 2005). Companies often use this deflection 
disclosure strategy in conjunction with the first, image enhancement, 
where positive environmental disclosures are used to enhance the 
company’s image and to divert attention away from the environmental 
crisis (Cho 2009).  
Cho (2009) examines the disclosure strategies of the oil company Total 
after two major environmental crises, namely the sinking of a tanker that 
caused an oil spill and an explosion at a chemical plant. After both crises 
the main disclosure strategy adopted was an image enhancement strategy 
(Cho 2009). Total was attempting to restore image and reputation and 
regain legitimacy (Cho 2009). However, after the second crisis, Total 
shifted towards using deflection and disclaimer strategies, leading Cho 
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(2009) to conclude that when a company faces major and multiple crises, 
there is an increasing need to use deflection and disclaimer disclosure 
strategies to manage their relevant public’s perceptions to regain their 
legitimacy. It is suspected that a particularly high profile single crisis 
event, such as the Gulf of Mexico oil spill, is enough to require the 
increased use of deflection and disclaimer strategies.  
In summary, after a legitimacy threatening crisis, a company is likely to 
attempt to regain legitimacy with disclosures aimed at image 
enhancement, disclaiming responsibility, and/or deflecting attention from 
the crisis. Companies attempt to enhance their image by increasing 
positive, self-laudatory disclosures. Companies attempt to disclaim 
responsibility by altering their relevant publics’ expectations through these 
positive disclosures. When repairing legitimacy, companies are most 
likely to use symbolic disclosures that conform to social values, and alter 
the expectations of their relevant publics, rather than using disclosures that 
avoid the event, because companies are thus able to portray themselves as 
being proactive and repentant without actually apologising, allowing them 
to decouple their actions from the event (O’Donovan 2002). Companies 
will also sometimes use positive disclosures to deflect attention away from 
the crisis event, making no attempt to change the expectations of their 
relevant publics (Cho 2009), but according to O’Donovan (2002), 
completely ignoring a high-profile crisis event is not feasible. The size of 
the Gulf of Mexico oil spill and the extent of the media attention it 
generated probably mean that oil companies were not able to ignore the 
incident in their disclosures. Therefore, deflecting attention should not be 
a viable option here. Therefore, it is expect that BP and other major oil 
companies to have reacted to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill with image 
enhancing and disclaiming responsibility disclosures, but not deflection 
disclosures.  
2.4 Annual report disclosures 
Annual report disclosures are commonly used by companies to manage 
their relevant public’s perceptions and to regain legitimacy after a crisis 
(O’Donovan 2002) and studies have shown that many different 
stakeholders call for the disclosure of environmental information in annual 
reports (De Villiers 1998; De Villiers & Vorster 1995) and that the 
managers who make the disclosure decisions are aware of it (De Villiers 
1999). Being a major public document ensures that the annual report is 
influential in relevant publics’ perceptions (Andersen & Epstein 1995). By 
increasing the environmental disclosures within these reports, companies 
that have directly caused an environmental crisis, or that operate within the 
crisis industry, are able to convey an image of ethical responsibility and 
accountability (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000). The Gulf of Mexico oil 
spill was an environmental crisis of unprecedented proportions. Therefore 
it impacted severely on BP’s legitimacy. The extent of the crisis also 
raised the question whether similar disasters could be expected in future. 
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In this way, it also impacted on the image and legitimacy of other oil 
companies.  Therefore, it is expected that all of the major oil companies 
responded with annual report disclosures.  
2.5 BP’s legitimacy crisis versus the other oil companies 
Prior research show that all companies in a crisis industry respond with 
additional disclosures (Patten 1992; Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000). We 
expect BP, who caused the crisis, to have perceived their legitimacy 
questioned most, because the crisis made BP appear less responsible than 
the rest of the industry, making it harder for them to regain their 
legitimacy (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000). Therefore, BP would have 
had to increase environmental disclosures more than the other companies 
in the industry in order to regain legitimacy (O’Donovan 2002; Patten 
1992).  
3. Background: Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill 
On April 20th 2010 an explosion and fire occurred on the Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig at the Macondo well just off the coast of Louisiana, which 
eventually sank the vessel on April 22nd 2010 (BP 2010). During that time 
and in subsequent months until the well was permanently plugged with 
cement on September 19th 2010 (Det Norske Veritas 2011, p.2), a total of 
4.9 million barrels of oil were discharged from the Macondo well into the 
Gulf of Mexico (Schaaf & Apple 2010). The event caused the death of 11 
people, serious injury to 17 others, and the greatest environmental disaster 
in the United States’ history (Bryant & Hunter 2010). The oil spill caused 
permanent ecological, environmental and economic destruction to the Gulf 
of Mexico area (Gore 2010). There was damage to the coastline, unsightly 
pollution, the death of fish and wildlife, and the elimination of jobs that 
were the livelihood of many people including fishermen, and restaurant 
and hotel owners (Lee 2010). For example, the Gulf of Mexico fishing 
industry, which in 2008 supported over 213,000 workers was prohibited 
from fishing in the Gulf until November 15th 2010, causing workers to be 
dismissed and sales to decrease as customers became concerned about the 
safety of Gulf seafood (Upton 2011).  
BP made many attempts to stop the discharge of oil before succeeding. 
The successful method was to drill two relief wells and to seal the 
Macondo well with a static-kill procedure (Det Norske Veritas 2011). The 
depth of the well added to the complexity and cost of these methods. 
According to BP’s 2010 Income Statement, the cost of sealing and the 
clean-up and remediation costs totalled $40.9 billion. This cost was 
expected to increase considerably as BP faces future litigation and 
remediation expenses (BP 2010). Although payment of such costs will 
impact significantly on BP’s operations, they expect to recover some of 
these costs from Transocean who own the site of the oil spill, the 
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Deepwater Horizon rig, which BP had leased from March 2008 until 
September 2013 (Det Norske Veritas 2011).  
4. Method 
This study examined oil company annual report disclosure responses to 
the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. This research focussed on two issues, 
namely changes in the volume of environmental disclosures, and the 
disclosure strategy used (image enhancement, disclaimer, and/or 
deflection). In addition, disclosures were reviewed for any other prominent 
characteristics. Environmental disclosures in the annual reports of BP, 
Total, Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips, being the largest 
oil companies by market capitalisation (Fortune 2010) for 2009 (before the 
crisis) and 2010 (after) were compared and the 2010 reports further 
examined in light of our legitimacy theory derived expectations. These oil 
companies frequently benchmark against each other (BP 2010; Total 
2010). According to the legitimacy derived expectations, it is likely that a 
major environmental crisis in one of these companies will impact the 
legitimacy of the other companies. 
The annual reports were chosen as the basis of analysis because, as shown 
by Warsame, Neu and Simmons (2002), they are the primary source of 
information for institutional investors (Hutchins 1994), individual 
investors (Epstein & Freedman 1994) and environmental groups (Patten 
1992). So annual reports are used by many different relevant publics and 
managers can be expected to use annual reports to attempt to manage the 
perceptions of these relevant publics. Annual reports are perceived as 
highly credible due to the considerable amount of regulations monitoring 
its preparation including the financial audit (Warsame, Neu & Simmons 
2002). These regulations cause some uniformity across companies, 
facilitating comparison and increasing reliability of comparison (Neu, 
Warsame & Pedwell 1998).  
Changes in the environmental disclosures of the six oil companies’ 2009 
(BP 2009; Chevron 2009; ConocoPhillips 2009; ExxonMobile 2009; Shell 
2009; Total 2009) and 2010 (BP 2010; Chevron 2010; ConocoPhillips 
2010; ExxonMobile 2010; Shell 2010; Total 2010) annual reports, were 
examined initially by way of sentence counts, a method used extensively 
in environmental reporting research (e.g., Hackston & Milne 1996; De 
Villiers & Van Staden 2011). This method allowed qualitative information 
to be divided into different categories to facilitate an analysis of the 
increases in the types of environmental disclosures made (Abbott & 
Monsen 1979). The primary interest was in changes in volume of 
environmental disclosures from 2009 to 2010, making this sentence count 
method appropriate. Also, Hooks and Van Staden (2011) demonstrate that 
volume counts and quality scores of environmental disclosures yield 
highly correlated results, providing further support for our method. This 
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volume measure has the added advantage that it can be more reliably 
coded, because it is less likely that coders disagree on coding categories 
than with other methods (Milne & Adler 1999; Hooks & Van Staden 
2011).  
Following Wiseman (1982), disclosures were regarded as environmental if 
it relates to environmental regulations or requirements, actions taken to 
alleviate an environmental issue; environmental policies, efforts to reduce 
environmental impact; expenditures on environmental activities, or 
litigation for environmental actions. Prior research was followed and 
disclosures were categorised on the basis of whether the disclosures reflect 
positively, negatively, or neutrally on the company (Hackston & Milne 
1996; Cormier & Magnan 1999). A separate category for information in 
BP’s 2010 annual report was created which directly relates to the Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill. This category includes any information that would not 
have appeared in the annual report had the oil spill not occurred. This 
category allows for more comparisons and additional analyses.  
Percentage increases/decreases were calculated between 2009 and 2010 
for all the categories of disclosure mentioned above. Percentage changes 
are deemed appropriate, because the annual report lengths range from 40 
to 320 pages, arguably rendering direct comparisons less effective. We 
expect a relatively large increase in disclosure from 2009 to 2010 for each 
of the companies, with BP showing the largest increase. Such a finding 
would be consistent with legitimising disclosure behaviour. 
The disclosure strategies used were also examined. This was undertaken to 
learn more about the disclosure patterns, motivations, and strategies 
companies use to regain legitimacy. These disclosure strategies are image 
enhancement, disclaimer, and deflection strategies aimed at regaining 
legitimacy. Better understandings of disclosure strategies following a 
known environmental disaster will potentially enhance our ability to 
interpret disclosures in general, e.g., when there is no known 
environmental disaster. 
5. Results 
5.1 BP disclosures 
5.1.1 Sentence count comparison 
Table 2, Panel A shows the percentage change from 2009 to 2010 for the 
number of sentences of environmental disclosures in BP’s annual reports. 
As expected, there was an increase in the overall amount of environmental 
information that BP disclosed from 2009 to 2010. Specifically, BP 
provided 43% more positive disclosures in their 2010 annual report than in 
their 2009 annual report. Negative (27%) and neutral (5%) disclosures also 
increased, but by smaller proportions than positive disclosures. These 
large increases in disclosure show that BP felt the need to provide more 
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information to their relevant publics about their environmental activities. 
These increases were interpreted as a need to regain legitimacy after the 
oil spill, a strategy that takes more disclosure than to maintain legitimacy 
(O’Donovan 2002). 
Table 2: Comparison of BP annual reports – environmental 
disclosures 
 Percentage Change  (2009 – 2010) 
Sentence 
Count 
 Positive Negative Neutral Gulf Spill 
PANEL A - Total for Report +43.31% +26.89% +5.26% 958 
Total for Sections  Section Percentage of Total for 2009 B 
PANEL B - Section Percentage 
of Total for 2009 A 
Positive 
Total = 
254 
Negative 
Total = 
119 
Neutral 
Total = 
304 
 
Business Review (Total) 75.98% 66.39% 65.46%  
   Corporate Responsibility  34.65% 42.86% 32.89%  
Directors and Senior Management 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%  
Corporate Governance 12.60% 5.04% 11.51%  
Directors’ Remuneration Report 5.91% 0.00% 3.95%  
Additional information for 
shareholders 2.36% 19.33% 8.88%  
Financial Statements 3.15% 9.24% 10.20%  
 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  
 Section Percentage of Total for 2010 
Sentence 
Count 
PANEL C - Section Percentage 
of Total for 2010 
Positive 
Total = 
362 
Negative 
Total = 
151 
Neutral 
Total = 
320 
Gulf Spill 
Business Review (Total) 78.57% 70.86% 64.38% 450 
   Corporate Responsibility  34.89% 12.25% 28.43% 77 
Directors and Senior Management 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0 
Corporate Governance 9.62% 0.66% 7.81% 149 
Directors’ Remuneration Report 6.32% 1.32% 1.56% 8 
Additional information for 
shareholders 3.02% 22.52% 15.62% 116 
Financial Statements 2.47% 4.64% 10.63% 235 
 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%  
 
Notes: 
A As the structure of the annual reports was different, the sections for the 2009 annual report 
were amended to correlate with the structure of the 2010 sections to facilitate comparison. 
B Calculations were done as follows: Total positive environmental disclosures for Business 
Review for 2009 were 193 and total positive environmental disclosures in 2009 annual report 
were 254 so 193/254 = 75.98%. 
Table 2, Panels B and C show the proportion of the total environmental 
disclosures contained within the various sections of the 2009 and 2010 
annual reports for each disclosure category. The table shows that although 
BP increased their total environmental disclosures in 2010 (Panel A), the 
Vol. 18, No. 2, June 2012    
115 
 
proportion of these disclosures contained within the various sections of 
their annual reports remained very similar to 2009. There is a difference 
between the proportions of environmental disclosures in the Additional 
Information for Shareholders section for the neutral disclosure category. 
There were 9% of the neutral disclosures in that section in 2009 and 16% 
of the neutral disclosures in that section in 2010. A possible explanation 
for this difference that is consistent with Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 
(1998), is that BP sees the provision of environmental information to 
shareholders as more important because of shareholders’ significant power 
over the company. Another difference was identified with the proportion 
of total environmental disclosures in the Corporate Responsibility section 
of BP’s annual reports for the negative disclosure category. There were 
only 12% of the negative disclosures in that section in 2010, but 43% in 
2009. This large difference must be due to the imperative of trying to 
manage relevant publics’ perceptions regarding the oil spill. 
Table 2, Panel C also provides information about the number of sentences 
contained within the different sections of the 2010 annual report pertaining 
to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. Every section in BP’s annual report apart 
from Directors and Senior Management contained some information 
about the oil spill. The dispersion of this information was quite even 
across the different sections. This dispersion was interpreted as an 
indication that BP recognised the importance of signalling to all 
stakeholders that the company was taking responsibility, that the damage 
was under control, and that future surprises would be unlikely. 
5.1.2 Disclosure strategies 
The above results show that BP increased their environmental disclosures 
and provided information about the oil spill to regain their legitimacy. 
Further insights can now be gained by examining the strategies undertaken 
by BP to communicate with their relevant publics.  
Image enhancement strategy  
In a similar response to Total after their environmental crises, BP used the 
image enhancement strategy most extensively to regain their legitimacy 
after the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. They undertook two different methods 
when using this strategy. Both methods involved making self-praising 
disclosures about the company to deflect attention away from the negative 
aspects of the oil spill, and to show their relevant publics that they were 
committed to being environmentally and socially responsible. Firstly, BP 
reiterated their commitment to undertake all actions to remedy any damage 
caused by the incident. 
[BP] have set up a $20-billion fund to show our willingness and 
capacity to pay all legitimate claims for compensation. [...] [BP] 
have committed $500 million to a 10-year independent research 
programme that will examine the environmental impact of the oil 
spilled and dispersants used. [...] Having taken a total pre-tax 
charge of $40.9 billion in relation to the accident and oil spill, we 
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announced our intention to sell up to $30 billion of assets. [...] 
changes we have made following the Gulf of Mexico incident [...] 
creating an enhanced, independent Safety and Operational Risk 
function (BP 2010, pp.6-14).  
In making these disclosures BP also demonstrated how important they felt 
those actions were to assist in regaining their legitimacy. This is illustrated 
in Table 3 showing the number of times information about significant 
actions taken in response to the oil spill appeared in different sections of 
BP’s 2010 annual report.  
Table 3: Number of sentences in sections of BP annual report 2010 
containing information about the Gulf of Mexico oil spill 
 Issue mentioned 
Section $20bn Oil 
Spill Fund 
$500m 
Research 
Programme 
$30m 
Asset 
Disposal 
Safety & 
Operational 
Risk Function 
Business Review     
Chairman’s letter 1 1 1  
Group Chief Executive’s 
letter 
1 1  1 
Progress in 2010 1    
Group Overview 1  3 4 
Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill 3 1   
Exploration and Production    1 
Refining and Marketing    1 
Liquidity and Capital 
Resources 
1  1  
Corporate Responsibility      
   Safety    1 
   Environment  2   
   Employees    1 
Research and Technology  1   
Corporate Governance     
Board Performance Report 2 1 1 1 
Directors’ remuneration 
report 
    
Part 2 Executive Directors’  
remuneration 
   1 
Additional information for 
shareholders 
    
Critical accounting policies 1    
Legal proceedings  1    
Financial Statements     
Notes on financial 
statements 
5 2 1  
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BP repeated this commitment to remedial activities without elaborating on 
them. Information about these remedial activities was sometimes repeated 
more than once within one subsection, e.g., the creation of the safety and 
operational risk function was mentioned twice in the Group Overview 
subsection. The fact that BP repeated the same remedial information in 
different sections shows an attempt to regain legitimacy from different 
relevant publics, because different relevant publics would be focussed on 
different sections in the annual report. The most disclosures about the $20 
billion oil spill fund were made in the Financial Statements section 
indicating that BP views this information as valuable for their financial 
stakeholders. Also, two disclosures were made about the $500 million 
research programme in a relatively small section, Environment indicating 
that BP wanted any environmental groups to know about their 
commitment to repairing any long term damage caused by the oil spill.  
The second method BP adopted in using an image enhancement strategy 
involved attempts to use positive disclosures to divert their relevant 
public’s attention away from the oil spill. 
BP will continue to be a leader of high-quality hydrocarbons today, 
while developing the intelligent options we will all rely on 
tomorrow. Lower-carbon resources remain central to this long-term 
strategy [...] To achieve this, we must ensure that safety and 
responsibility are at the heart of everything we do (BP 2010, p.7). 
Although this statement can be seen as largely symbolic, it nevertheless 
associates BP with positive imagery and appears to commitment the 
company to eventually exit the oil business while presumably remaining in 
the energy business.  
Disclaimer strategy 
A disclaimer strategy was used by BP to ensure they were not seen as 
totally responsible for the actions that caused the oil spill. 
BP holds a 65% interest in the Macondo well, with the remaining 
35% held by two joint venture partners. While BP believes and will 
assert that it has a contractual right to recover the partners’ shares 
of the costs incurred, no recovery amounts have been recognized in 
the financial statements (BP 2010, p.38). 
By disclaiming total responsibility BP attempts to lessen the negative 
association their relevant publics might harbour. This facilitates the 
framing of BP’s actions in response to the oil spill in a positive and 
proactive manner as might be expected of a responsible corporate citizen. 
Deflection strategy 
There was no indication of BP solely using a deflection strategy after the 
Gulf of Mexico oil spill. This strategy may not have been possible due to 
the high profile of the oil spill and the established public perception that 
BP was to blame (Dittrick 2010). However, aspects of a deflection strategy 
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can be discerned. A deflection strategy was used in conjunction with an 
image enhancement strategy to divert attention away from the oil spill 
through the use of positive disclosures.  
In summary, this analysis shows how BP provided information to their 
relevant publics about the oil spill in a way that optimised any legitimacy 
regaining possibilities. This was done through positive disclosures that 
were aimed at enhancing their image, while simultaneously deflecting 
attention away from the negative consequences of the oil spill, and also by 
disclaiming some of the responsibility for the oil spill.  
5.2 Major oil companies’ disclosures 
5.2.1 Sentence count comparisons 
Table 4 provides the percentage change from 2009 to 2010 for the total 
number of sentences of environmental disclosures made in the annual 
reports of BP, Shell, Total, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and ExxonMobil for 
each disclosure category. The BP disclosure information is repeated here 
to facilitate comparison.  
Table 4: Comparison of oil companies annual reports 2009 and 2010 – 
environmental disclosure 
 Positive Sentence Count  
 Total – 2009 Total – 2010 Positive % Change 
BP 254 364 +43.31% 
Shell 84 128 +52.38% 
Total 132 192 +45.45% 
Chevron 32 48 +50.00% 
ConocoPhillips 40 65 +62.50% 
ExxonMobil 41 67 +63.41% 
  Mean excluding BP   +54.75% 
  Mean including BP   +52.84% 
 Negative Sentence Count  
 Total – 2009 Total – 2010 Negative % Change 
BP 119 151 +26.89% 
Shell 43 68 +58.14% 
Total 99 96 -3.03% 
Chevron 63 66 +4.76% 
ConocoPhillips 0 1 +100.00% 
ExxonMobil 5 5 0% 
  Mean excluding BP   +31.97% 
  Mean including BP   +31.13% 
 Neutral Sentence Count  
 Total – 2009 Total – 2010 Count 
BP 304 320 +5.26% 
Shell 77 112 +45.45% 
Total 189 218 +15.34% 
Chevron 96 166 +72.92% 
ConocoPhillips 15 13 -13.33% 
ExxonMobil 35 33 -5.71% 
  Mean excluding BP   +22.93% 
  Mean including BP   +19.99% 
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As expected, there is an increase in the environmental disclosures for all of 
the major oil companies. This is most pronounced for the positive 
environmental disclosures with all of the oil companies showing an 
increase. Four of the six oil companies also increased their negative and 
neutral environmental disclosures.  
It was expected that BP would increase their disclosures by more than the 
other oil companies, because BP had a greater need to regain legitimacy. 
However, Table 4 shows that when BP is excluded, the mean increase is 
larger (54.75% for positive, 31.97% for negative and 22.93% for neutral) 
than when BP’s disclosures are included (52.84% for positive, 31.13% for 
negative and 19.99% for neutral). These results show that the Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill affected all of the major oil companies. They all felt the 
need to increase in their environmental disclosures in 2010. The 
legitimacy theory framework leads to a belief that this was in order to 
ensure legitimacy under conditions where the oil spill made it likely that 
oil company legitimacy would be questioned and that oil companies could 
suffer due to the withdrawal of resources. 
5.2.2 Disclosure strategies 
Image enhancement strategy 
An image enhancement strategy was mostly used by the major oil 
companies to try to regain oil industry legitimacy. By making disclosures 
that emphasised their commitment to help repair any damage from the oil 
spill and prevent any future incidents, the oil companies could ensure that 
their relevant publics recognised their efforts and rewarded them with 
legitimacy. Here are some disclosure examples: 
The Macondo incident in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico underscored that 
safe operations are fundamental to our ability to operate. Following 
Macondo, we led the industry in working with regulators to 
enhance operating standards in the Gulf (Chevron 2010, p.2). 
Since April 2010, public discussions about safety in the oil industry 
have been dominated by the Deepwater Horizon incident in the 
Gulf of Mexico. This tragic incident reflects poorly on our 
industry. It will take a lot of effort to re-establish trust in our 
industry. Drilling responsibilities at our rigs are clear, and we 
assure both ourselves and regulators that all necessary safety 
measures have been put in place (Shell 2010, p.6).  
Following BP’s accident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, TOTAL 
geared up to learn lessons from the disaster, analyze the potential 
risks for its operations in the light of these events and make 
recommendations to improve safety in deep-offshore 
environments, leading to a creation of three task forces (Total 
2010, p.303).  
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We were saddened by the tragic oil spill in the deepwater Gulf of 
Mexico this past summer, and assisted in response efforts 
(ConocoPhillips 2010, p.4) 
The majority of these disclosures were made in the Chief Executive 
Officer’s letters allowing the oil companies to convey to their relevant 
publics the importance of this information to them. They could also 
convey to their relevant publics the significant effect that their remedial 
actions would have by making them more socially and environmentally 
responsible. The oil companies also assured readers that a similar disaster 
would be unlikely to occur in their company. They tried to show that they 
are already operating in a way that ensures the protection of the 
environment. Here are some examples:  
The company’s performance was grounded in a strong safety 
culture, which resulted in our safest year ever (Chevron 2010, p.2). 
Our good safety record shows that we have the capability to access 
oil and gas safely and responsibly. [...] The number of operational 
oil spills was down significantly from 2009 (Shell 2010, p.6). 
In 2010, Total reasserted the priority on safety and the environment 
as part of its operations and investments throughout its business 
(Total 2010, p.52). 
 [...] recording our safest year since the inception of ConocoPhillips 
in 2002 (ConocoPhillips 2010, p.2).  
We continued our industry-leading safety performance achieving 
our best ever lost-time incident rates in 2010 (ExxonMobil 2010, 
p.2) 
Disclaimer strategy 
There were no direct disclaimers in the annual reports of the other oil 
companies. However, as mentioned above, they made a point of 
mentioning the actions they had undertaken to remedy the damage caused 
by the spill and prevent any future disasters. Therefore, the oil companies 
were able to indirectly disclaim responsibility for the oil spill, while also 
portraying themselves as responsible corporate citizens and fixing 
problems caused by others.  
Deflection strategy 
There was no evidence of a deflection strategy being used by the other oil 
companies in their environmental disclosures. The likelihood of their 
relevant publics knowing that BP is responsible and the amount of 
publicity about the oil spill would have made a deflection strategy 
ineffective.  
In summary, the other oil companies mainly used an image enhancement 
strategy to regain their industry’s legitimacy after the oil spill. They used 
positive disclosures about the oil spill and the state of their current 
operations to make themselves appear socially and environmentally 
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responsible, while also allowing them to indirectly disclaim responsibility 
for the oil spill. Due to the fact that the oil spill was a high profile known 
event, the oil companies did not try to deflect attention away from the oil 
spill. Instead they emphasised their own superior controls that would 
prevent such spills in their firms and the actions they had undertaken to 
remedy the damage caused by the spill. 
6. Discussion 
The preceding analyses show that oil companies’ annual report reactions 
to the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill are consistent with legitimacy theory 
explanations. In the case of BP, the amount of environmental information 
they disclosed, the sections in their annual report in which this information 
was disclosed, and the strategies used to convey that information are all 
consistent with a strategy to regain legitimacy. BP increased the amount of 
environmental disclosures for all disclosure categories after the oil spill, 
but particularly for the positive disclosures, demonstrating their desire to 
repair their threatened legitimacy.  
The method BP used to attempt to repair this legitimacy was to adopt 
disclosure strategies that framed their increased environmental disclosures 
in a way that attempts to manage their relevant publics’ perceptions 
(Dowling & Pfeffer 1975). BP predominantly used an image enhancement 
strategy when making disclosures. This is consistent with Cho (2009), 
who found Total using this strategy after their Erika oil spill. The 
disclosures were made in several sections in the annual report. We 
interpret this as an attempt by BP to ensure that different relevant publics, 
who focus on different sections, all got the image enhancing message they 
were trying to send. For example, BP made more neutral disclosures in 
2010 within the Additional Information for Shareholders section, typically 
aimed at financial stakeholders, but made less negative disclosures within 
the Corporate Responsibility section, likely to be more important to 
environmental groups. In doing this, and by keeping the proportion of the 
total environmental disclosures within the sections of the annual report 
similar to 2009, BP could ensure their relevant publics received 
information that would reflect more positively on their environmental 
responsibility, thereby facilitating the regaining of legitimacy. 
The image enhancement strategy also allowed BP to respond to the 
negative publicity about the oil spill (Douglas 2010). As environmental 
issues are becoming increasingly important (Manning 2004) and there is a 
heightened emergence of ethical investors (Bauer, Derwall & Otten 2007), 
any events that negatively impact on the environment are now likely to 
receive much media attention (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that BP chose to disclose positive information to put a 
positive spin on the negative media attention (Deegan & Rankin 1996). 
The combination of using an image enhancement strategy with a partial 
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disclaimer strategy meant BP could provide their relevant publics with 
information that challenged the negative publicity from the media. They 
could show that they recognised their part in the oil spill through their 
significant remedial activities, while also showing that they were 
maintaining their other social and environmental responsibilities.  
The remedial activities disclosures show that BP found it important to 
manage the perceptions of all of their relevant public groups. This is 
contrary to the findings of Oliver (1991) and Neu, Warsame & Pedwell 
(1998), who showed that companies are likely to privilege their most 
important relevant publics, such as shareholders, whilst ignoring or paying 
only symbolic attention to less important ones, such as environmental 
groups. This may be due to the well-known, high profile nature of the Gulf 
of Mexico oil spill, where a concerted effort targeting all of the relevant 
publics were deemed necessary. The constant repetition of the same 
remedial activities information throughout all sections of the 2010 annual 
report was an interesting approach. This strategy is interpreted as an 
attempt to increase the volume of environmental disclosure without 
providing any additional information that may lead to further litigation 
against the company. An example of this repetition is information about 
the $20 billion oil spill trust fund, which was disclosed five times in the 
“Financial Statements” section, a section that is of interest to financial 
stakeholders. Also, information about the $500 million research 
programme was disclosed two times in the relatively short “Environment” 
section. Environmental groups would be interested in BP’s commitment to 
fix the damage caused by the oil spill and are likely to refer to this section. 
These examples show BP attempting to positively influence different 
relevant publics’ perceptions by repeating positive aspects such as 
remedial actions without further elaboration. The bad news regarding the 
oil spill was common knowledge and could not be denied. The only 
credible positive spin BP could put on it was the fact that they were paying 
for the remediation. The fact that they had no choice in the matter, that 
they were forced to take remedial action (Juhasz 2011), was not mentioned 
in the annual report. This is an important finding as it extends prior 
literature such as Patten (1992) and Cho (2009) by showing that BP 
attempted to ‘pad’ the volume of their environmental disclosures by 
repeating the same information without elaborating. This could have been 
driven by the fears of disclosing additional information that could lead to 
further claims. As a result, the annual report actually provides very little 
information to BP’s relevant publics about the oil spill.  
The disclosures of the other major oil companies suggest they were also 
affected by the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. These oil companies also 
attempted to regain their legitimacy through increases in environmental 
disclosures in their 2010 annual reports. This is consistent with Patten’s 
(1992) finding that an environmental crisis affects the legitimacy of the 
entire industry, not just the responsible company. Apparently companies 
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respond to this challenge more noticeably when a company’s industry 
experiences an environmental crisis.  
When increasing these disclosures the oil companies mainly used an 
image enhancement strategy to manage their relevant publics’ perceptions. 
They provided information about their preparedness to assist in repairing 
the damage of BP’s accident and to claim a high level of safety for their 
own operations. Whilst using this image enhancement strategy, they could 
simultaneously disclaim responsibility for the oil spill, while also 
proclaiming that a similar incident would be unlikely to occur within their 
companies (Suchman 1995). Disclosing information about their remedial 
activities is an attempt to manage relevant publics’ perceptions that could 
lead to access to resources withdrawn from BP (Bryant & Hunter 2010).  
Cho (2009) shows that there is an increased need for various disclosure 
strategies when a company faces a sequence of multiple crises. The 
findings show that companies also require the use of various disclosure 
strategies when faced with a single major crisis characterised by negative 
media attention. This is true even for other companies in the same industry 
as the crisis company. 
7. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to assess the disclosure patterns and 
disclosure strategies used by the major oil companies in response to BP’s 
Gulf of Mexico oil spill in order to develop a better understanding of 
disclosure decisions and strategies made under crisis conditions. The 
findings show that after the oil spill there was an increase in the amount of 
positive, negative, and neutral, environmental disclosures made by BP and 
the other major oil companies in their 2010 annual reports. In BP’s case, 
the proportion of these disclosures contained within the various sections of 
their annual report appeared to remain similar to the proportion used by 
them in 2009.  
According to our analyses, image enhancement was the most common 
disclosure strategy. In addition, BP disclaimed total responsibility but 
claimed partial responsibility for the oil spill. The other major oil 
companies used remedial activity disclosures to demonstrate their 
innocence in the events surrounding the oil spill. No evidence of a 
deflection strategy was found and put this down to the fact that this crisis 
was too large and well known to ignore. 
These findings are generally consistent with our legitimacy theory 
expectations. The increase in the disclosure of positive environmental 
news that was identified in all of the major oil company’s environmental 
disclosures after the oil spill shows that when their legitimacy is 
threatened by a crisis they will use their disclosures to manage their 
relevant publics’ perceptions in an attempt to regain that legitimacy. They 
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will also use disclosure strategies that are suited to their operating 
environment and that will enable them to manage perceptions most 
effectively. This was shown by the use of image enhancement and partial 
disclaimer disclosure strategies but not a deflection strategy, the latter 
probably due to the extensive media attention surrounding the spill.  
By way of extension, it was evident that BP made an effort to increase 
environmental disclosures whilst limiting the content of the disclosures. 
Specifically, information about certain significant remedial activities is 
repeated various times in the annual report, often verbatim, and sometimes 
within the same section, but often between the different sections. This 
information was given without further elaboration. This strategy ensured 
that readers of the annual report were likely to encounter these positive 
disclosures independent of the readers’ particular focus or interests. These 
disclosures ensure that relevant publics could obtain (and could hardly 
miss) positive remedial activity disclosures, as well as about other positive 
environmental activities.   
This research contributes to the understanding of corporate disclosure 
strategies aimed at regaining legitimacy after an environmental crisis by 
identifying that: 
• companies within an industry are likely to use the same annual 
report disclosure strategies to regain legitimacy after a crisis, 
namely an increased volume of environmental information that 
reflect positively on the company, along with disclaiming 
responsibility for the crisis, either in full or partially, depending 
on the extent to which the company can credibly disclaim 
responsibility; 
• the company responsible for the crisis is likely to disclose a large 
volume of information about the crisis, especially given a 
significant amount of negative media attention; 
• the disclosures are likely to provide information that is largely 
already known, in order to minimise the risk of providing 
information that could be useful to potential litigants against the 
crisis company; 
• the company is likely to achieve larger volumes of disclosure 
without providing additional information by duplicating the same 
remedial activity information (including impressive sounding 
dollar amounts) over and over again, both within the same 
sections and between sections in the annual report; and 
• if the crisis company was forced into remedial actions (such as in 
this case by the US Government), the company is unlikely to 
disclose this fact in the annual report.  
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These disclosure strategies puts the best spin on a negative situation and 
managers see this as providing the best likelihood of appeasing corporate 
relevant publics.  
The findings have implications for the interpretation of environmental 
disclosures by annual report users and by researchers. Regulators may also 
factor these findings into their decisions regarding possible future 
disclosure regulations. In addition, although the use of these disclosure 
strategies is not advocated, the possibility that managers may find these 
disclosure strategies of interest cannot be ruled out. 
Some possible limitations need to be mentioned. Firstly, the extent to 
which the findings can be generalised can be questioned, because the 
research examined disclosures in an environmentally sensitive industry 
and the response to a very high profile environmental crisis. As a result, 
the reactions examined may have been exaggerated and may not be 
evident in other industries and under conditions of lesser legitimacy 
threats. However, it is believed that this high profile case makes the 
reactions easier to identify and this could improve the understanding of 
reactions to lesser incidents.  
Taking these limitations into account, there are various issues that could 
be addressed by future research to help further explain the reactions of 
companies to a crisis, e.g. examining corporate disclosure reactions to 
other social or environmental crises in different industries, a longitudinal 
study on the disclosure decisions of the oil companies after the oil spill, 
and a longitudinal study of other industries after social or environmental 
crisis. Such studies could provide additional insights useful in further 
theory development.  
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